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Paul M. Secunda† 
INTRODUCTION 
Although by no means a new question regarding retirement, the 
noteworthy growth of “gig companies”1 in the “sharing economy,”2 has 
renewed concerns that even more American workers will lack access to 
employment-based retirement plans.3 The gig economy, however, does 
“offer[] workers advantages including more independence and 
flexibility, . . . company-sponsored retirement saving is not one of 
them.”4 This is a “dangerous” state of affairs as employment-based 
 
 † Professor of Law and Director, Labor and Employment Law Program, Marquette University 
Law School. Georgetown Law School, J.D.; Harvard College, A.B. I would like to thank Deepa Das 
Acevedo, Miriam Cherry, David Pratt, and Natalya Shnitser, for their comments on earlier drafts 
of this paper. I would also like to thank my research assistant, Ashley Wubben, Marquette 
University Law School Class of 2016, for her excellent research assistance on this article. This 
article is dedicated in loving memory of Edith B. Godick, my maternal grandmother, who taught 
me, through example, the values of compassion, kindness, and fighting for the underdog. 
 1 Gig companies have been “defined as relying on the internet to match buyers and sellers of 
services.” Robert J. Samuelson, Is the Gig Economy the Labor Market’s New Reality? Nope, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/commentary/sdut-gig-econ 
omy-robert-samuelson-2016sep02-story.html [https://perma.cc/L4SM-HWAS]; see also Shu-Yi Oei 
& Diane Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence from Internet Discussion Forums, 8 COLUM. 
J. TAX L. 56 (2017) (discussing “meteoric rise of Uber Technologies, Inc.,” a ride-sharing company, 
including the fact that it has more than 160,000 drivers who have received $656.8 million in 
payments from Uber in the last three months of 2014, and that Uber has provided one billion rides 
worldwide as of the end of 2015). 
 2 The sharing economy refers to a “new model of production and consumption of goods 
and services often referred to as ‘sharing.’” Oei & Ring, supra note 1. Other terms for “sharing 
economy” include: “‘the disaggregated economy,’ ‘the peer-to-peer economy’ (P-2-P), ‘the human-
to-human economy’ (H-2-H), ‘the community marketplace,’ ‘the on-demand economy,’ ‘the App 
economy,’ ‘the access economy,’ ‘the mesh economy,’ ‘the gig economy,’ and also, ‘the Uberization 
of everything.’” See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 89 (2016). 
 3 Sixty-six percent of 114 million private-sector workers have access to a retirement plan 
through work. Therefore, 34% of 114 million private-sector workers (39 million) do not have access 
to a retirement plan through work. See US DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES — MARCH 2016 (2016), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ 
ebs2.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL4E-CPGJ]. 
 4 See Mark Henricks, Retirement Plans for the Gig Economy, MAIN ST. (Feb. 29, 2016), 
https://www.mainstreet.com/article/retirement-plans-for-the-gig-economy [https://perma.cc/3G3M 
-GM3Y]. 
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retirement plans make up a critical part of an individual’s strategy for 
retirement security.5 
Such retirement plans, like the nearly-ubiquitous 401(k) plans,6 
provide a necessary bulwark against destitution in old age. This is 
especially so given that Social Security provides only partial income 
replacement,7 and that few Americans have put away much in private 
savings.8 Yet independent contractors, which are how most gig 
companies classify their workers,9 are approximately two-thirds less 
likely than standard employees to have access to an employer-provided 
retirement plan.10 Much academic and judicial ink has already been 
spilt over whether Uber drivers and other members of the sharing 
economy are independent contractors or employees.11 This classification 
is of utmost importance because it largely determines whether gig 
workers are covered by employment laws, as most such laws center on 
the employer-employee relationship.12 
Surveys have indicated that a significant number of gig workers 
want—and need—to have employer-based retirement plans.13 Into the 
 
 5 See Paul M. Secunda & Brendan S. Maher, Pension De-Risking, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 733, 
734 (2016) (“Retirement planning is not only difficult, but also dangerous. It is dangerous for 
individuals because poor planning can mean post-employment penury.”). 
 6 401(k) plans are defined contribution (DC) pension plans in which employees may defer a 
percentage of their salary into a tax-preferred individual account held in trust. See id. at 735. 
 7 See Mark Miller, How to Improve Your Retirement Income if You Haven’t Saved, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/your-money/retirement-savings-income-social-
security.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/S8VN 
-EQMY]. 
 8 See Matthew Frankel, Here’s the Average American’s Savings Rate, MOTLEY FOOL (Oct. 3, 
2016), http://www.fool.com/investing/2016/10/03/heres-the-average-americans-savings-rate.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/2WLB-A5NZ] (“According to the latest data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, the personal saving rate in the United States is 5.7% . . . This is far too low to adequately 
prepare most people for retirement and unexpected expenses . . . Most experts recommend saving 
at least 10% to 15% of your income.”). 
 9 See Veena Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker 
Identities, 105 CAL. L. REV. 101, 103 (2017). 
 10 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., CONTINGENT WORKFORCE: SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS, 
EARNINGS, AND BENEFITS 6 (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669766.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/T4HE-A35R]. 
 11 For a sampling of recent cases regarding gig worker classification issues, see Cotter v. Lyft, 
Inc., 176 F.Supp.3d 930 (N.D. Cal. 2016); O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 311 F.R.D. 547 
(N.D. Cal. 2013); Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765, at *1-8 
(Cal. Dept. Lab. June 3, 2015), aff ’d No. CGC-15-546378 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 16, 2015). For a 
sampling of academic scholarship on the employee/independent contractor debate over the years, 
see generally Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy 49 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1511, 1513 (2016) (citing various articles taking different approaches). 
 12 Means & Seiner, supra note 11, 1513–14 (“Employees cost more than independent 
contractors because businesses are responsible for . . . payroll taxes, workers’ compensation 
insurance, health care, minimum wage, overtime, and the reimbursement of business-related 
expenses.”). 
 13 See WILLIAM G. GALE, SARAH E. HOLMES & DAVID C. JOHN, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, 
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breach, a number of proposals have emerged to provide “independent 
workers” or “independent contractors,” who work for gig companies, 
with some form of portable, occupational retirement benefit.14 These 
proposals are certainly praiseworthy for recognizing a substantial 
problem: the need to provide gig workers with portable retirement 
security given the sporadic, non-exclusive, frequently part-time nature 
of most of this work.15 However, most of the extant proposals concede a 
critical point by concluding that gig workers are not employees but 
rather some type of independent contractor, for purposes of employment 
law.16 
Although a number of other papers have considered the 
consequences of gig work on labor and employment laws,17 this is the 
first article to establish why it is essential that individuals who work in 
the sharing economy be considered common law employees for 
retirement purposes. By being common law employees, these workers 
qualify for consumer protections under the Darden test of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).18 Not only would gig 
workers thereby qualify for fiduciary, disclosure, vesting, and other 
important ERISA-specific protections, but ERISA also provides an ideal 
pension structure that works well with the itinerant, sporadic, non-
exclusive nature of gig work.19 
 
RETIREMENT PLANS FOR CONTINGENT WORKERS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 8 (Sept. 23, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/rsp923paper1.pdf [https://perma.cc/W374 
-VSED] (“[R]ecent survey indicated that 31 percent of the users of a specific software product said 
that their main concern as an independent worker was a lack of employer-sponsored benefits.”). 
 14 See, e.g., SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR 
MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” 2 
(Dec. 2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first 
_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD4V-YTD4]. 
 15 See NATALIE FOSTER, GREG NELSON & LIBBY REDER, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, PORTABLE 
BENEFITS RESOURCE GUIDE 7 (2016), https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2016/07/ 
resource_guide_final8-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJT8-WGYS] (describing on-demand economy 
participation as sporadic, a source of secondary income, and sometime involving more than one 
company). 
 16 See GALE ET AL., supra note 13, at 9–22 (surveying various non-ERISA approaches to 
providing portable retirement benefits to gig workers). 
 17 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 2; Means & Seiner, supra note 11; Dubal, supra note 11; BRISHEN 
ROGERS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, REDEFINING EMPLOYMENT FOR THE MODERN 
ECONOMY 1 (Oct. 2016), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Redefining_Employment_for_ 
the_Modern_Economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKS5-ZHY8]. 
 18 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1191 (2012); see Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 
(1992) (finding that common law “control test” applies to ERISA employee definition). 
 19 To be clear, a gig worker would have to be a common law employee to qualify for coverage 
under ERISA. This is critical because only ERISA provides for the MEP pension structure. 
However, open MEPs are not currently allowed under the current statutory and regulatory 
structure and legislation has been introduced in Congress (or will be re-introduced) to allow them. 
See generally infra Part III.A, B & C. 
17 SECUNDA PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/17  8:48 PM 
438  THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2017 
 
More specifically, open multiple employer plans (Open MEPs) 
allow unaffiliated employers to pool their resources and offer retirement 
plans to their employees under the statutory protections of ERISA.20 By 
designating a professional service provider to administer an Open MEP 
for their employees, gig companies can largely limit fiduciary liability; 
their only fiduciary actions would be the selection and subsequent 
monitoring of the Open MEP sponsor.21 
If large gig companies, like Uber, Lyft, Handy, or TaskRabbit, were 
to join the same Open MEP, then their employees could easily move 
between these employers. This dynamic would be beneficial for 
employees who must work part-time and who sometimes work for two 
or more of the platform companies simultaneously.22 With the Open 
MEP model, these gig employees can pocket retirement contributions 
all in one individual retirement account. Not only will stiffening market 
competition from gig companies like Juno, who are willing to treat their 
workers voluntarily as employees, increasingly cause more traditional 
gig companies to change their employment models,23 but tax incentives 
based on number of employees participating will make it worthwhile for 
gig companies to voluntarily join such plans for their employees.24 
Additional retirement plan participation can be ensured for employees 
by placing them into plans automatically under automatic enrollment 
provisions.25 Employees not wishing to participate in the retirement 
plans could simply opt-out if they choose to do so, though experience 
with opt-out provisions in current retirement plans indicates that most 
will not.26 
 
 20 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL, OUTSOURCING EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT PLAN SERVICES 18–22 (2014), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2014ACreport3.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/87UW-H5SP] [hereinafter OUTSOURCING EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN SERVICES]. 
 21 Id. at 19 (“Effectively, the participating employer has outsourced the provision of retirement 
benefits.”). 
 22 Open MEPs should be attractive to employers given market forces and tax incentives. See 
infra Part III.B. 
 23 See Aarti Shahani, Uber Competitor in NYC Promises Drivers Benefits, Even Employee 
Status, NPR (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/08/22/490655 
700/uber-competitor-in-nyc-promises-drivers-benefits-even-employee-status [https://perma.cc/2L 
74-FS8S]. 
 24 See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 215 (2004) (“ERISA represents a ‘careful 
balancing’ between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the 
encouragement of the creation of such plans.”). 
 25 See Robert Steyer, Auto-escalation Use in 401(k) Plans Too Low, Northern Trust Reports 
Find, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENT (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.pionline.com/article/20160919/ON 
LINE/160919841/auto-escalation-use-in-401k-plans-too-low-northern-trust-report-finds?newslett 
er=daily&issue=20160919 [https://perma.cc/366N-CC9N] (currently about fifty-two percent of 
private sector plans have auto-enrollment features). 
 26 See Paul M. Secunda, The Behavioral Economic Case for Paternalistic Workplace Pensions, 
91 IND. L. REV. 505, 526 (2016) (“Overcoming the force of inertia, these opt out plans immediately 
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This article sets out a model for providing retirement benefits for 
gig workers in the sharing economy in three parts. Part I surveys 
current efforts to provide portable benefits for gig workers and 
discusses their various shortcomings, including the concession of lack 
of employee status and consequent loss of ERISA protections. Part II 
argues that many gig workers, though certainly not all, are common law 
employees under the control test that applies under ERISA. Having 
established employee status, Part III explores the advantage of ERISA 
coverage for both employer and employees, including the flexibility of 
the Open MEP retirement plan structure for gig companies to provide 
their employees with retirement plan benefits. 
I. SAMPLING OF CURRENT EFFORTS TO PROVIDE PORTABLE 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS TO GIG WORKERS 
Although there has long been a need for cohesive retirement plan 
policy to address the retirement crisis in the United States,27 the 
development of the gig marketplace has accelerated the demand for 
workable retirement programs for itinerant workers. As it is, members 
of the so-called “contingent” workforce or “precariat” (part-time, leased, 
temporary, and per diem workers) do not normally receive retirement 
benefits as part of their employment.28 The problem among these 
workers with the lack of access to retirement benefits has now been 
exacerbated by the growth and development of the gig economy.29 
What all these jobs have in common is that the work activity is 
happening outside of the traditional “safety net” of employment and is 
highly unstable.30 Whereas statutory “employees” are covered in the 
United States by numerous labor and employment law statutes that 
provide security and protection in the workplace, workers in these 
 
led to much higher participation rates where plans were offered. Whereas 50% of employees had 
participated in the opt in method, now 85% or more participate under the opt out method.”). 
 27 See Secunda, supra note 26, at 506–07 (“The American retirement security system hangs 
treacherously on a precipice . . . All in all, too many Americans are saving too little for 
retirement.”). 
 28 See Dubal, supra note 9, at 103 (noting that “[s]ocial scientists refer to the growth of the 
casual workforce as the rise in the precariat—a class of workers whose relationship to employment 
is precarious or risky because it lacks stability and the benefits or regulation”) (citing Arne L. 
Kalleberg, Precarious Work, Insecure Work: Employment Relations in Transition, 74 AMER. 
SOCIOL. REV. 1 (2009); GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS (2011)). 
 29 See GALE ET AL., supra note 13, at 7 (“Based on the limited data available, it appears that 
contingent workers are generally unprepared for retirement.”). 
 30 Id.; see also Noam Scheiber, Uber Drivers and Others in Gig Economy Take a Stand, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/business/uber-drivers-and-others-in-the 
-gig-economy-take-a-stand.html [https://perma.cc/3Y2M-QHEY]. 
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alternative work arrangements are not.31 Formerly, “stable” 
employment relationships have given way to relationships that are 
much more “arms-length,”32 regardless of whether it is a contractor 
situation, temporary employment, or a one-time encounter.33 
To give an overview of what has been done to address the problems 
facing this part of the contingent workforce concerning the lack of 
retirement benefits for members, including the increasing number of 
gig workers, Part I is divided into three sub-parts: (1) national-level 
efforts to solve these retirement access issues for contingent workers, 
(2) state- and municipal-level efforts, and (3) private-sector efforts. As 
will be demonstrated, all these proposals, even though they increase 
access, fail a basic requirement for adequate retirement security—
fiduciary consumer protections for enrolled workers—because none of 
them provide for “employee” status under ERISA. 
A. National-Level “Solutions” 
1. Lessons from the Affordable Care Act 
One national solution is potentially to model a legislative scheme 
after the Affordable Care Act (ACA).34 In the seven years since Congress 
enacted the ACA, the numbers of Americans without health insurance 
has dropped precipitously.35 The ACA uses subsidized federal and state 
Health Marketplaces, along with the expansion of Medicaid, to account 
for these gains.36 All individuals must have access to affordable, 
minimum essential coverage under the ACA, or pay a tax penalty.37 
 
 31 See Rogers, supra note 17, at 1 (observing that misclassification, subcontracting and 
franchising all “tend to deprive workers of their rights under employment laws, which generally 
do not protect independent contractors and do not effectively protect many subcontracted workers 
or workers for franchisees”). 
 32 Aspen Institute, The Honorable Phyllis C. Borzi (Assistant Secretary for the Employee 
Benefits Security Administration, U.S. Dept. Labor), Retirement Security in the On-Demand Econ-
omy, YOUTUBE (Mar. 11, 2016), https://youtu.be/MySsCe9G6yI [https://perma.cc/J5QL-VA36]. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
 35 Key Facts about the Uninsured Population, THE HENRY KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Sept. 
29, 2016), http://kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population [https:// 
perma.cc/JB4C-2943] (showing uninsured populations peaked at 18.2% of population in 2010 and 
demonstrating uninsured population has dropped to 10.5% in 2016 or by 7.7%). 
 36 Id. (“Coverage gains were seen in new ACA coverage options. As of March 2016, over 11 
million people were enrolled in state or federal Marketplace plans, and as of June 2016, Medicaid 
enrollment had grown by over 15 million (27%) since the period before open enrollment (which 
started in October 2013).”). 
 37 See Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (“[T]he individual 
mandate . . . requires individuals to purchase a health insurance policy providing a minimum level 
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Health insurance can be obtained through public programs (if eligible), 
through one’s employer (if offered), or through individual policies 
offered on an Exchange or through the private market.38 Individuals in 
certain income brackets are eligible for premium assistance tax credits 
if their employers do not provide the requisite coverage.39 
So, perhaps not surprisingly, it has been proposed that retirement 
coverage be offered in the same way as health coverage has been under 
the ACA.40 An expanded Social Security could play the role of Medicaid 
for low income workers, employers could still offer retirement plans, but 
employees who lack access could purchase retirement plans on a 
“federal backstop plan.”41 The advantage is, especially for gig workers, 
that under such a plan, workers would have access to a retirement plan 
without having to be connected to an employer for a specific period or 
duration.42 
The disadvantages, unfortunately, of such an ACA-based 
retirement marketplace are fairly straightforward. The biggest 
problems are that it does not necessarily require workers to receive 
retirement benefits through their employer and therefore, such workers 
would not be “employees,” entitled to the consumer protections of 
ERISA.43 Additionally, given the unpopularity of such Exchange 
programs in the current political environment, there is little reason to 
believe that such ideas will gain much traction at the federal level. 
2. myRA 
The Obama administration recently developed myRA, a program 
meant to help shrink the retirement gap by providing access to 
retirement plans for workers in the United States who currently do not 
have such access.44 Deposits to myRA accounts by individuals are not 
 
of coverage.”). 
 38 See COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 373 (4th ed. 2015). 
 39 Id. at 375. 
 40 See Amy B. Monahan, An Affordable Care Act for Retirement Plans, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 459, 
472 (2014). 
 41 Id. at 478. 
 42 Id. at 472. 
 43 Conceivably, a pension-based ACA proposal could include or require similar fiduciary 
consumer protections as ERISA does, but it is telling that the ACA itself chose not to include such 
protections for non-employees. 
 44 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MYRA, https://myra.gov/?utm_expid=112154954-9.nz5h8ogB 
QpaO0c770moe0g.0 [https://perma.cc/HDL8-F7DM]. MyRA was discontinued by the Trump 
administration in 2017. See Tara Siegel Bernard, Treasury Ends Obama-Era Retirement Savings 
Plan, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/business/treasury-retire 
ment-myra-obama.html?mcubz=3&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PFD2-V5JF]. 
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tax-deductible but instead grow tax-deferred and come out tax-free 
upon retirement.45 All workers can invest, including those who want to 
supplement an existing 401(k) plan, as long as their household income 
falls below $191,000 per year.46 Another advantage of myRA accounts 
are their portability, so that they move with the worker and are not 
connected to any particular job or jobs in which an individual is 
employed.47 
Unfortunately, the program is not well-funded through 
government subsidies with regard to the income tax foregone in the 
form of tax-deferred contributions, so its near-universality as far as 
eligibility means that there is a lifetime contribution cap of $15,000.48 
Once the $15,000 cap is met, employees have the option to roll over their 
myRA savings into a private-sector Roth Individual Retirement 
Account (IRA),49 likely to be managed by a private investment 
company.50 
Moreover, employers do not match employee contributions and 
there are no tax subsidies in place to incentivize lower income people to 
contribute.51 Finally, unlike a Roth IRA, rather than having individuals 
choose from a variety of investments available in the marketplace,52 
myRA establishes a fund that invests in a government-managed 
program guaranteed by taxpayers.53 Also, unlike Roth IRAs, accounts 
will solely invest in government savings bonds, limiting risk, but also 
limiting the growth potential of such retirement contributions.54 
 
 45 See How it Works, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MYRA, https://myra.gov/how-it-works/ [https:// 
perma.cc/GTE2-8XAD]. 
 46 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MYRA: A SIMPLE, SAFE, AFFORDABLE RETIREMENT SAVINGS 
ACCOUNT, https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/FINAL%20myRA%20Fact%20Sheet 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXQ3-MKZU] (“MyRAs will be Roth IRA accounts available to anyone who 
has an annual income of less than $129,000 a year (for individuals and $191,000 for couples.” [sic]). 
 47 See id. (“Portable – not tied to a single employer.”). 
 48 GALE ET AL., supra note 13, at 13 (“MyRA users can save up to $15,000 in those accounts; 
once they hit the $15,000 threshold, they have the option to roll their savings over into a private 
sector Roth IRA and continue saving.”). 
 49 See Matthew Malone, What is a Roth IRA?, ROTHIRA.COM, http://www.rothira.com/what-
is-a-roth-ira [https://perma.cc/BXE8-MTUN] (“A Roth IRA is a special retirement account where 
you pay taxes on money going into your account and then all future withdrawals are tax free.”). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Employers, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MYRA, https://myra.gov/employers/ [https://perma.cc/ 
9QL9-TS2P] (“[Employers] don’t administer employee accounts, contribute to them, or match 
employee contributions.”). 
 52 See Kevin McCormally, Why You Need a Roth IRA, KIPLINGER, http://www.kiplinger.com/ 
article/retirement/T046-C006-S001-why-you-need-a-roth-ira.html [https://perma.cc/R45K-ASE6] 
(“You can invest your Roth IRA in almost anything—stocks, bonds, mutual funds, CDs or even real 
estate.”). 
 53 See How it Works, supra note 45. 
 54 See id. (“Your account will safely earn interest at 2.375% APR during the month of 
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So as one commentator has observed, the program is “not so much 
a retirement vehicle, but a way for households to have a little bit of 
rainy day funds.”55 Also, given the long-term horizon of most retirement 
plan investing, the short-term, low-risk nature of government saving 
bonds is ill-suited for the need to generate investment returns on such 
contributions over a long period.56 Needless to say, myRA does not come 
close to providing the type of adequate retirement security most gig 
workers are going to need. 
B. State and Municipal-Level “Solutions” 
1. Automatic-IRA Retirement Saving Plans 
After more than twenty states started to develop automatic-IRA 
retirement savings plans for workers without access to retirement plans 
through their employers, the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Employee 
Benefit Security Administration (EBSA) stepped in to make sure that 
such plans would not be considered preempted by ERISA.57 In its final 
regulations, Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-
Governmental Employees, the EBSA “describes circumstances in which 
state payroll deduction savings programs with automatic enrollment 
would not give rise to the establishment of employee pension benefit 
plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as 
amended (ERISA).”58 
With more than 39 million workers in the United States without 
access to occupational retirement plans and with the federal 
government unable or unwilling to take the necessary steps as 
illustrated above, more and more states are attempting to fill the gap 
left by the voluntary-based private sector benefit system under 
 
December 2016.”). 
 55 See Trent Gillies, Retirement Options Dwindle, and States Steps in. But Should They?, 
CNBC (Nov. 8, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/06/retirement-options-dwindle-and-states-
step-in-but-should-they.html [https://perma.cc/4K4R-7975] (Treasury views the myRA program 
“not so much as a retirement vehicle, but a way for households to have a little bit of rainy day 
funds.”) (quoting Teresa Ghilarducci). 
 56 See Bob Dannhauser, Pension Fund Governance and Long-Term Investing: Why Old Habits 
Die Hard, CFA INSTITUTE BLOG (Mar. 19, 2015), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/ 
2015/03/19/pension-fund-governance-and-long-term-investing-why-old-habits-die-hard/ [https:// 
perma.cc/4KMC-9EG4] (“mak[ing] the case for effective governance correlating with effective long-
horizon investing”). 
 57 EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., RIN 1210-AB71, SAVINGS ARRANGEMENTS ESTABLISHED 
BY STATES FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.dol.gov/sites/ 
default/files/ebsa/temporary-postings/savings-arrangements-final-rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/B578 
-F6UC]. 
 58 Id. at 1. 
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ERISA.59 Legislation for state-based private retirement plans has 
already passed in Illinois, Oregon, and Washington State.60 The idea 
behind “state payroll deduction saving programs with automatic 
enrollment” is to provide employees tax-favored individual IRAs funded 
by payroll deductions.61 Under these programs, “employers 
are . . . required to remit the payroll deductions to state-administered 
IRAs established for the employees.”62 This is still a voluntary program 
and payroll deductions may be ceased by employees at any time.63 
As alluded to above, there is some concern that these payroll 
deduction saving programs would be preempted by ERISA, as state 
laws related to employee benefits under § 514 of ERISA.64 The new 
EBSA regulations make clear that not only are such state plans not 
preempted, but that in the future, similar municipal plans may also not 
be preempted.65 
Even without ERISA making these state and municipal laws void, 
the lack of ERISA protection is still the problem. Just like with models 
based on the ACA and myRA, these plans only survive by taking away 
the critical ERISA consumer protections to workers to ensure the 
protection of their retirement benefits. Without such protections, and 
with the brutal history of broken public pension problems in many 
states as a guide to how their retirement plans may be treated under 
state law in difficult fiscal times,66 one wonders if many employees will 
trust their money with such programs. 
 
 59 Id. at 2. Although employees who do not have access to employer-sponsored retirement 
plans could purchase their own Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), only about ten percent do. 
Id. 
 60 See, e.g., California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§§ 100000–100044 (2012); Connecticut Retirement Security Program Act, 2016 Conn. Legis. Serv. 
16-29 (West); Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/1–95 (2015); 
Maryland Small Business Retirement Savings Program Act, Ch. 324 (H.B. 1378) (2016); Oregon 
Retirement Savings Board Act, Ch. 557 (H.B. 2960) (2015). 
 61 EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., supra note 57, at 3. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 29 U.S.C. § 1114. 
 65 See Hazel Bradford, Municipalities Ready to Join Rush to Private-Sector Plans, PENSIONS 
& INVESTMENTS (Sept. 5, 2016), http://www.pionline.com/article/20160905/PRINT/309059983/ 
municipalities-ready-to-join-rush-to-private-sector-plans [https://perma.cc/2NE2-Z9ZE] (“Pressed 
by some cities and retirement advocates to do more, DOL officials also proposed that other 
governmental entities be allowed to offer such programs.”). 
 66 See generally Paul M. Secunda, Litigating for the Future of Public Pensions, 2014 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 1353. 
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2. Black Car Fund Model 
On a more limited scale, a number of states have worked out 
innovative models for independent contractors to still benefit from 
protective employment legislation by treating them as “employees” for 
purposes of some specific laws. The most prominent example is the 
Black Car Fund, which is a workers’ compensation fund created by 
statute in New York for taxi drivers.67 Like with ERISA, under New 
York and other states’ workers’ compensation law, a worker has to be 
an “employee” to be eligible for these benefits.68 Through this legal 
fiction, the Black Car Fund statute provides workers’ compensation to 
independent contractor taxi drivers, and the Fund itself serves as 
employer of record only for the purpose of providing workers’ 
compensation.69 New York funds this scheme with a 2.5% transaction 
fee on every taxi ride.70 Not surprisingly, the idea of “pooling” is at the 
center of this scheme: pooling allows for taxi companies to participate 
and contribute to the Fund without worrying about worker 
classification issues. 
One idea, then, would be to treat gig employees at the federal level 
as “employees” under ERISA only for purposes of employers making 
contributions to retirement plans. Although this type of arrangement 
would make an end-around sticky worker-classification issues, many 
problems would still remain. For instance, there is no precedent on the 
federal level for treating independent contractors as employees for the 
purpose of one law, but not for others. Indeed, as discussed below, many 
federal employment statutes have rather unhelpful employee 
definitions and fall back on the common law control test to determine 
employment status.71 
Some may say the answer lies in keeping the program at the state 
or even municipal level where there is some precedent for treating 
independent contractors as employees for very limited purposes.72 Here 
the problem is less with a limiting principle and more with the fact that 
the Black Car Fund only works because it is limited to one industry 
(taxis), for a relatively inexpensive, uncomplicated purpose (workers’ 
compensation), and through no charge to the employer or employee 
 
 67 See History, THE BLACK CAR FUND, http://www.nybcf.org/history [https://perma.cc/S93A-VZ 
63]; see also FOSTER ET AL., supra note 15, at 16. 
 68 See id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See infra Part II. 
 72 See supra notes 67–70. 
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(rather through transaction fees to taxi customers).73 Even if you were 
to define the industry as “all gig companies” and provide contributions 
by placing a fee on every gig transaction, providing adequate retirement 
security is not as simple as providing funding for workers’ 
compensation. 
C. Private-Sector Solutions 
With the federal, state, and municipal government floundering in 
their efforts to address the lack of retirement savings for too many 
Americans, it is unsurprising that the private-sector has stepped up to 
provide programs on its own or in cooperation with gig companies. For 
instance, private internet companies, like Peers, Honest Dollar, and 
Betterment, are offering to provide retirement benefits, as well as other 
benefits and human resource services, to gig companies.74 The 
outsourcing of the retirement saving function to these Professional 
Employee Organizations (PEOs) is increasingly common as employers 
seek to limit their fiduciary liability under ERISA.75 
But this current situation in the gig workplace does not mimic the 
classic outsourcing fiduciary model. Instead, companies like Uber have 
contracted with these private companies to provide access to retirement 
benefits to their workers.76 And if such workers are offered retirement 
benefits, such benefits are a mere gratuity, something that the 
employer has no responsibility for maintaining or administering as a 
fiduciary.77 That arrangement would not bode well for gig workers given 
that fewer than ten percent of workers without access to a workplace 
retirement plan actually contribute to a retirement savings on their 
 
 73 See The Black Car Fund, supra note 67. 
 74 See Home, PEERS, http://www.peers.org [https://perma.cc/UP9X-MPUB]; Home, HONEST 
DOLLAR, https://www.honestdollar.com [https://perma.cc/TR55-LYZX]; Home, BETTERMENT, http:// 
www.betterment.com [https://perma.cc/L4WT-Q9XQ]. 
 75 Professor Colleen Medill has shown comprehensively how “complete outsourcing,” where an 
unrelated third-party is made the “name fiduciary” of a benefit plan, could be considered a settlor 
function that is not a fiduciary act and therefore, would relieve plan sponsors of all fiduciary 
responsibility. See Colleen Medill, Regulating ERISA Fiduciary Outsourcing, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
505, 533–34 (2017). Medill is correct that complete outsourcing should be significantly regulated. 
Id. at 546. 
 76 Lyft offers its drivers a payroll deduction IRA through the financial technology firm, Honest 
Dollar. See GALE ET AL., supra note 13, at 10. On the other hand, Uber collaborates with 
Betterment for access for workers to an IRA and financial counseling. Id. 
 77 For an example of this set-up, see Noam Scheiber, Care.com Creates a $500 Limited Benefit 
for Gig-Economy Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/busi 
ness/carecom-creates-a-500-limited-benefit-for-gig-economy-workers.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ 
HRB5-GQZW] (finding online marketplace for family caregivers offers $500 a year for workers to 
use for health care, transportation, or education expenses). 
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own78 and that one out of three workers does not have access to a 
workplace retirement plan at all.79 Thus, these arrangements between 
gig companies and professional service providers are yet another reason 
to seek employee status for gig workers under ERISA. 
II. GIG WORKERS AS EMPLOYEES 
Needless to say, this article would be unnecessary if gig employers 
would voluntarily consider their workers as “employees” for ERISA 
purposes. Indeed, there are some prominent examples, including the 
taxi service Juno, competing against Uber and Lyft, of employers who 
are doing just that if workers work for them exclusively (i.e., like normal 
full-time employees).80 Juno takes a smaller commission from their 
riders, and in addition to benefits like retirement plans, also has set 
aside half of the companies’ stock for its drivers.81 Juno focuses on 
recruiting Uber and Lyft’s best drivers, those who average more than 
4.75 stars on customer feedback.82 So far Juno is operating with 13,000 
workers in New York City, but they have big plans to take on Uber and 
Lyft more generally.83 Juno appears to recognize the market advantage 
in supplying the best gig workers with employee status and employee 
benefits. So, there is at least a chance that at some point gig companies 
will be forced by market competition to voluntarily recognize employee 
status where their competitors do so. 
But to be more realistic about the immediate future of worker 
classification in the gig marketplace, one must recognize that the gig 
business model works by keeping labor costs extremely low and treating 
its workers as “commodities” that can be “deactivated” when not acting 
in a productive or profitable manner.84 Both Uber and Lyft are fighting 
tooth and nail, and not only in the United States, to keep their workers 
as independent contractors under the law and so far, no court in the 
United States has found these workers to be employees.85 
 
 78 Borzi, supra note 32, at 22:33. 
 79 Id. at 22:39. 
 80 See Shahani, supra note 23 (“[Head of Juno] says it’s only fair to offer the option because, 
while drivers may set their own hours, the ride-hailing company is the one that exercises control 
over the other terms, the rules, the prices.”). 
 81 Id. 
 82 See Scheiber, supra note 30 (“Unlike sellers on eBay or Etsy, Uber drivers cannot set the 
prices they charge. They are also constrained by the all-important rating system—maintain an 
average of around 4.6 out of 5 stars from customers in many cities or risk being deactivated—to 
behave a certain way, like not marketing other businesses to passengers.”). 
 83 See Shahani, supra note 23. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See Lobel, supra note 2, at 132–33. 
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Workers are employees under ERISA based on the control test set 
out in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden.86 Darden “defines 
an employment relationship as a relationship of control: the employer 
plans out tasks, gives orders, and monitors performance.”87 
Unfortunately, as other astute commentators have pointed out, 
weighing factors such as whether the work is performed at the 
company’s premises (hardly ever with gig work) versus whether the 
company controls how the work is done and closely supervises the work, 
“cloud, rather than illuminate, the central question in such cases: 
whether the worker is truly in business for him or herself. Many 
employment relationships, after all, are not defined by rigid task 
definition and control.”88 
At least historically, an employer was only liable for a tort 
committed by a worker over whom the employer exercised sufficient 
control,89 because “an employer exercising control over its workers 
should be responsible to others for its workers’ actions.” The Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) employs one form of the control test to determine 
whether employers need to pay employment taxes (federal 
unemployment insurance, Social Security, and Medicare taxes) or 
withhold federal taxes from its employees’ wages (income, Social 
Security, and Medicare).90 
As with all balancing tests, the control test has been criticized for 
yielding indeterminate, unpredictable results. Quite literally, two 
judges could hear the exact same case with the same factors and 
reasonably come to diametrically opposed outcomes. Problems in 
application include that the factors are unweighted, no single factor is 
dispositive, and not all apply in every case.91 Paradoxically, the test has 
also come under scrutiny for being a one-size-fits-all test used without 
due regard to the many different contexts to which it is applied.92 All 
that being said, “regardless of how a particular employment standard 
is articulated, no judge will hold a firm liable for employment violations 
 
 86 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
 87 See Rogers, supra note 17, at 2. 
 88 Id. at 3. 
 89 See Myra H. Barron, Who’s An Independent Contractor? Who’s An Employee?, 14 LAB. LAW. 
457, 459 (1999). 
 90 See JEFFREY M. HIRSCH, PAUL M. SECUNDA & RICHARD A. BALES, UNDERSTANDING 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 8 (2d ed. 2013) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 
C.B. 296). 
 91 Id. at 9. 
 92 Id. 
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without first considering the influence (whether exercised or reserved) 
that the firm has over working conditions.”93 
Darden itself involved the interpretation of Section 3(6) of ERISA, 
which circularly defines the term “employee” to “mean[ ] any individual 
employed by an employer.”94 The facts of Darden are fairly 
straightforward. Darden, a long-time insurance operator for 
Nationwide Insurance, was enrolled in the company’s retirement plan.95 
He exclusively sold Nationwide insurance policies on commission.96 The 
retirement plan had a “bad boy” non-competition clause, which said 
Darden would forfeit his retirement benefits if he competed against 
Nationwide within a year of leaving and within twenty-five miles of his 
previous business location.97 Nationwide terminated Darden and then 
Darden began selling competitor insurance policies immediately from 
his same office location as an independent insurance agent.98 
Nationwide responded by implementing the non-competition clause and 
taking away Darden’s already accrued retirement benefits.99 Darden 
sued Nationwide under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA100 for violating the 
vesting provisions of Section 203(a) of ERISA.101 
Noting that ERISA itself did not supply the scope of the meaning 
of “employee” under the statute, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in 
these circumstances it was necessary to fall back to the established 
meaning of that term under the common law agency doctrine.102 
Adopting the common law test for employee status under ERISA in 
Darden, the Court summarized that test as stated in the Reid case: 
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the 
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s 
right to control the manner and means by which the product is 
accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry 
are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and 
tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship 
 
 93 Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern 
Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1705 (2016). 
 94 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6). 
 95 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 319–320 (1992). 
 96 Id. at 320. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. Generally, such bad-boy clauses are unenforceable under ERISA if applicable vesting 
schedules have been met for the retirement plan. See Medill, supra note 38, at 143. 
 100 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). 
 101 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 320 (1992); 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a). 
 102 Id. at 322 (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 
(1989)). 
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between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to 
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the 
hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the 
method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying 
assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of 
the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the 
provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the 
hired party.103 
The Supreme Court then remanded the case to determine whether 
Darden was an employee of Nationwide under this common law test.104 
It may at first seem unlikely that a large number of gig employees 
would be considered employees under the Darden common law 
employee test. However, recent events in both the United States and 
the United Kingdom suggest the tide is definitively turning in finding 
more of these gig workers to be common law employees. For instance, 
in the United Kingdom, two Uber drivers were recently found to be 
employees for purposes of British minimum wage laws.105 Similarly, in 
the United States, a recent decision from the California Employment 
Development Department found an Uber driver to be an employee for 
purposes of eligibility under unemployment law.106 As these laws in the 
United Kingdom and the United States rely on similar factors as the 
control test under ERISA, there is good reason to believe that workers, 
especially those that receive a majority or all of their income from gig 
companies and work full-time hours, will also be considered employees 
and qualify for ERISA protections. 
In the meantime, as this article goes to press, class action 
employment litigation continues across the country to determine 
whether Uber drivers are employees or independent contractors. One 
prominent example is O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.107 O’Connor 
involves Uber drivers, who believe as common law employees under the 
California Labor Code, they are entitled to various labor and 
 
 103 Id. at 323–24 (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52 (footnotes omitted)). 
 104 Id. at 328. 
 105 See Toby Meyjes, Uber Drivers Win Battle to Receive National Minimum Wage and 
Holiday Pay, METRO UK (Oct. 28, 2016), http://metro.co.uk/2016/10/28/uber-drivers-win-battle-to-
receive-national-minimum-wage-and-holiday-pay-6220730/#ixzz4OhHSKSoT [https://perma.cc/P 
6E5-722W]. 
 106 See Chris Roberts, Updated: Another Uber Driver Awarded Unemployment Benefits, SF 
WEEKLY (Mar. 4, 2016), http://archives.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2016/03/04/uber-driver-awarded-
unemployment-benefits-first-known-case-in-state [https://perma.cc/LQ5A-YME6]. 
 107 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (Chen, J.); see also O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 
13-CV-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 4398271, at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016) (denying motion for 
preliminary approval of settlement). 
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employment law protections and benefits, including provisions 
involving tips given to employees.108 The O’Connor court, applying a 
similar common law control test, denied Uber’s motion for summary 
judgment based on its conclusion that, “Plaintiffs are Uber’s 
presumptive employees because they ‘perform services’ for the benefit 
of Uber,” and that the ultimate question of whether the Uber worker is 
an employee or independent contractor is a mixed question of law and 
fact and appropriate for juror determination.109 
Of course, O’Connor is just the tip of the gig worker 
misclassification litigation iceberg. As Orly Lobel has chronicled, 
“[r]ecent class action suits brought against [Uber and Lyft] by drivers 
claiming misclassification stress the degree of control and direction the 
companies exercise.”110 For instance, and as seen in O’Connor, 
“plaintiffs claim that, while drivers decide when to turn on the app to 
get notifications about ride requests, drivers ‘must respond to 
assignments generated by the Uber computer system “within seconds” 
or they will lose the job.’”111 Various litigation has also established that 
ride-sharing services set pickup times, passenger pay rates, methods of 
payment, and which passengers the drivers must pick up.112 To be fair, 
there are other common law control factors that do appear to favor the 
view that gig workers are independent contractors, including that 
drivers use their own car, receive payment per job, and have the ability 
to control who to pick up during working hours in certain geographic 
areas.113 Yet, at least one prominent judge, Judge Edward Chen of the 
Northern District Court of California in San Francisco, has stated, “The 
idea that Uber is simply a software platform, I don’t find that a very 
persuasive argument.”114 
In any case, although this issue is far from being definitively 
decided, there is at least a reasonable argument that some gig workers, 
including Uber drivers, qualify as employees under the common law 
control test of Darden under ERISA. In the next section, this article 
assumes for the sake of argument that some gig workers will qualify for 
 
 108 O’Connor, 82 F.Supp.3d at 1135 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 351 (requiring employers to pass 
on entire amount of tip “paid, given to, or left for an employee by a patron”)). 
 109 Id. 
 110 See Lobel, supra note 2, at 133. 
 111 Id. (quoting Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-10769-NMG, 2014 WL 
1338148, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2014)). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. (citing Karen Gullo, Uber and Lyft Drivers May Have Employee Status, Judge Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-30/uber-drivers-
may-have-employee-status-judge-says. [https://perma.cc/5SQ6-NCX9]). 
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protection under ERISA as common law employees, and asks what the 
best mechanism might be for providing such workers with adequate 
employer-based retirement benefits. 
III. OPEN MEPS: THE BEST WAY TO PROVIDE RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
TO GIG EMPLOYEES UNDER ERISA 
Having established that current portable benefit proposals lack the 
critical recognition of employee status under ERISA and that common 
law employee protection under ERISA is probable for at least some 
group of gig workers, this Part examines three additional issues: (1) the 
advantages of ERISA protections for gig workers, (2) the suitability of 
the Open MEP model for gig employee retirement plans, and (3) the 
prospects of Open MEPs being legally recognized in the near future 
without hindrance by current regulatory impediments. 
A. Fiduciary Protection: The Ultimate Consumer Advantage of 
ERISA Protection 
To understand the advantages of ERISA to participants and 
beneficiaries of employer-sponsored retirement plans, it is necessary to 
see what problems employees encountered with their pension plans 
prior to ERISA. Chief among these pre-ERISA issues were lack of 
transparency, lack of funding, reneging on promised benefits after long 
years of service, and financial mismanagement and fraud.115 In 
response, ERISA provides reporting and disclosure provisions, vesting 
and minimum funding standards, and fiduciary protections, all of which 
can be enforced through a private right of action by participants and 
beneficiaries.116 
For instance, ERISA’s reporting and disclosure requirements 
include that not only basic benefit plan information be filed annually 
with the DOL on 5500 Forms,117 but that each plan issue a summary 
plan description and a summary of material modifications in language 
and in a form that an average lay person can comprehend.118 Because 
of these requirements, participants know and can enforce their rights 
under a plan, can make informed decisions concerning plan benefits, 
assist government agencies in ERISA enforcement, and promote 
compliance by plan sponsors (employers) and other plan fiduciaries.119 
 
 115 Medill, supra note 38, at 11–15. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 71–72 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1023). 
 118 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-1. 
 119 See Medill, supra note 38, at 66–68. 
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Although all the protective provisions of ERISA described above 
play an important role, the heart of ERISA is the fact that plan assets 
are held in trust and those that discretionarily operate, manage, or 
administer are fiduciaries and/or trustees of the plan.120 Such fiduciary 
status means that plan fiduciaries must put their own self-interest 
aside and act for the sole interest of plan participants and 
beneficiaries.121 More specifically, ERISA lays out four general fiduciary 
duties and a litany of prohibited practices that parties-in-interest and 
fiduciaries may not transact with regard to plan assets.122 The four 
general fiduciary duties include: (1) the duty of loyalty to act exclusively 
with the purpose to provide benefits to plan participants and 
beneficiaries; (2) the duty of care/prudence to act with the prudence that 
an objectively prudent fiduciary would in similar circumstances; (3) 
with regard to specified pension plans, to prudently diversify the Plan’s 
assets; and (4) the duty to follow the terms of the plans unless they 
conflict with the provisions of ERISA.123 In short, ERISA fiduciaries are 
like other trustees, who as Justice Cardozo famously commented: “[are] 
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not 
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then 
the standard of behavior . . . the level of conduct for fiduciaries [has] 
been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.”124 
If one is a fiduciary and abuses one of the fiduciary duties or 
engages in a prohibited transaction to which no exemption applies, the 
fiduciary can be sued by the DOL, participants, beneficiaries, or other 
fiduciaries for breach of fiduciary duties.125 Equitable damages include 
making the plan whole for any losses, disgorgement of profits, removal 
of the fiduciary, surcharge, equitable estoppel, reformation, restitution, 
injunction, or mandamus.126 In short, ERISA fiduciaries are subject to 
significant legal responsibilities and significant liability if they do not 
act with the necessary loyalty and prudence in carrying out their 
responsibilities to plan participants and beneficiaries. Fiduciary 
protection for retirement plan participants under ERISA is the gold 
standard. 
 
 120 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (“[A]ll assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one 
or more trustees.”). 
 121 Id. § 1104(a). 
 122 Id. §§ 1104–1108. 
 123 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(D). 
 124 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
 125 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), (3), (5). 
 126 See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011); Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. 
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993); Mass. Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). 
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B. The Open MEP Model under ERISA 
In order to take maximum advantage of both the consumer 
protections of ERISA and the flexibility in plan structures that ERISA 
permits, gig companies should adopt some form of Open MEP model for 
their employees.127 Essentially, the Open MEP model allows separate, 
independent, gig companies to mostly outsource the retirement benefit 
function to an entity that specializes in the provision of these benefits, 
with the fiduciary, disclosure, and other consumer protections of ERISA 
thrown into the bargain.128 By keeping these platform-based open 
MEPs under ERISA, the current trend of gig companies to privately 
contract retirement plan provisions to online service providers can be 
avoided.129 Unlike current arrangements with companies such as 
Betterment, Honest Dollar, and Peers, these MEPs will operate under 
fiduciary rules that require the MEP to act in the best interest of 
employee participants, with the duty of loyalty and care expected of 
such a provider under similar circumstances.130 Providers not living up 
to these exacting standards could be sued by the DOL, other plan 
fiduciaries, or participants or beneficiaries of the plan, just like any 
other breaching fiduciary under ERISA.131 This aspect of the open MEP 
is perhaps the most crucial advantage of providing a mechanism for 
permitting gig companies to provide retirement benefits through the 
financial intermediation of an open MEP trustee to lessen the financial 
and regulatory burden of providing such benefits.132 
There are a number of advantages to the Open MEP model for both 
gig employers and employees. From an employee perspective, perhaps 
one of the biggest problems that these employees face is the lack of 
access to retirement benefits.133 If one’s employer does not offer 
 
 127 29 U.S.C. § 1060(a) (provisions on multiple employer plans and other special rules). Open 
MEPs, including their advantages and disadvantages, are discussed in comprehensive detail in 
Advisory Opinion 2012-04A. See EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., ADVISORY OPINION LETTER 
2012-04(A) 1 (2012), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance 
/advisory-opinions/AO2012-04A_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB7X-4NGR]. The EBSA found that 
this arrangement was not an “employee pension plan” because no “employer” maintained or 
established the plan as required under Section 3(5) of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). 
 128 See OUTSOURCING EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN SERVICES, supra note 20, at 6–8. 
 129 See supra Part I.C. 
 130 See OUTSOURCING EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN SERVICES, supra note 20, at 8–12. 
 131 Id. at 9. 
 132 Id. at 6 (“Fiduciary risk may be further limited to the extent that the third party provides 
improved plan administration, management, and compliance processes.”). 
 133 See Nevin E. Adams, Big Apple Unveils MEP, Retirement Program for Private Sector 
Workers, NAPA.NET (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.napa-net.org/news/technical-competence/state-
auto-ira-plans/big-apple-unveils-mep-retirement-program-for-private-sector-workers [https://per 
ma.cc/GR67-NC4N]. 
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employee benefits (which they are legally able to do because employee 
benefit sponsorship in the United States is voluntary),134 then 
employees may be able to take advantage of one of the new state-based 
automatic IRA programs135 or seek to save through private IRAs. Either 
way, such employees have historically been shown either to save very 
little or nothing at all for retirement.136 
The solution for gig workers who are deemed “employees” under 
the ERISA Darden control test is to have their employers establish a 
gig worker open MEP. This model allows both employers and employees 
to pool their retirement contributions, like the Black Car Fund does, 
and get the best investment options at the lowest prices.137 The 
advantages for gig employers are the tax deduction that comes with 
such retirement contributions,138 the competitive advantage in 
obtaining better workers by offering a better benefit package (see the 
Juno example in Part II),139 and the ability to off-load most of their 
fiduciary liability in co-sponsoring such a plan.140 
The advantage to employees is the ability to not even have to think 
about retirement savings and automatically let it happen. By setting up 
an Open MEP with automatic enrollment and automatic escalation 
features with a wide variety of gig employers participating, not only 
would gig employees be able to take advantage of tax-exempt 
retirement savings, but they would also be enrolled and have a portion 
of their salary contributed to their individual MEP account without 
becoming bogged down in complex retirement decisions and 
procrastinating over various and complex investment options.141 
Because of their significant purchasing power and economies of scale, 
 
 134 See Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010) (“ERISA represents a ‘careful 
balancing’ between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the 
encouragement of the creation of such plans.” (quoting Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 
215 (2004))). 
 135 See Andrew Remo, DOL’s Proposed Safe Harbor for State Savings Programs: A Closer Look, 
NAPA.NET (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.napa-net.org/news/technical-competence/state-auto-ira-
plans/dols-proposed-safe-harbor-for-state-savings-programs-a-closer-look/ [https://perma.cc/FZE6 
-EKRT]. 
 136 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 137 See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text (on Black Car Fund pooling structure); see 
also GALE ET AL., supra note 13, at 12 (“MEPs have lower administrative costs and a simpler 
regulatory structure than a 401(k), and could be offered to independent workers as well as 
traditional employees if Congress and regulators approve.”). 
 138 See GALE ET AL., supra note 13, at 15 (“Research that focuses on low-income households, 
however, generally finds larger impacts of [tax] saving incentives on net saving.”). 
 139 See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (discussing Juno approach to gig workers). 
 140 See OUTSOURCING EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN SERVICES, supra note 20, at 6. 
 141 See Secunda, supra note 26, at 524–25 (discussing procrastination and inertia associated 
with many individuals when it comes to complex financial decisions involving retirement saving). 
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these Open MEPs would have access to lowest-price wholesale mutual 
funds and other investments so that gig employees would default into a 
highly-diversified, low-fee pension account.142 If gig employees wanted 
more control or had more financial savvy, they could easily opt-out and 
place their retirement money in whatever proportion in whatever funds 
the open MEP offers. 
C. The Future Viability of the Open MEP Model for Gig Employee 
Retirement Plans 
The good news is that Open MEPs are gaining increasing traction 
both in federal administrative guidance and in Congress. As far as 
administrative guidance, a recent DOL Interpretive Bulletin would 
allow states and cities to set up an automatic enrollment of participants 
into an IRA-based state program employing a MEP approach.143 Under 
such arrangements, “participating employers would be required to 
execute a participation agreement and would have limited fiduciary 
responsibilities (like prudently selecting the arrangement and a duty to 
monitor its operation).”144 The bad news here, at least for the proposal 
set forth in this article, is that it specifically declines to extend the Open 
MEP model to private sector-employers.145 The reason that the DOL is 
not currently permitting Open MEPs under ERISA “is because ‘the 
state has a unique representational interest in the health and welfare 
of its citizens.’”146 
On the legislative side of the ledger, Senator Orrin Hatch has 
introduced the Retirement Enhancement and Savings Act of 2016,147 
which would permit open MEPs for private sector employees and allow 
multiple employers to pool retirement funds into a single 401(k) 
retirement plan starting in 2020.148 Under current law, independent 
 
 142 Such a system would look and work much like the Australian superannuation (Super) 
guarantee retirement scheme. See id. at 545 (“[W]ith Super funds having so much money in their 
control, not only could the best money managers be hired, but the investment funds’ fees would 
likely be lowered.”). 
 143 See Remo, supra note 135 (“While to date no states have passed legislation creating such 
an arrangement, under the DOL’s guidance the state itself would be the plan sponsor, the named 
fiduciary and the plan administrator (but could also delegate those responsibilities to third 
parties.”)). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIRMAN’S 
MODIFICATION OF THE “RETIREMENT ENHANCEMENT AND SAVINGS ACT OF 2016” 3–14 (Sept. 21, 
2016), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4959 [https://perma.cc/T5KX-J 
G7A]. 
 148 See Precious Abraham & Ann Marie Breheny, Senate Committee Gives Retirement Savings 
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employers who wish to pool funds for retirement plan purposes must 
demonstrate a “common interest.”149 Moreover, another difficulty under 
current law is the so-called “one-bad-apple rule,” which disqualifies the 
entire MEP from favorable tax treatment if one employer does not meet 
the applicable tax rules.150 
Senator Hatch’s Open MEP proposal would remove the “common 
interest” requirement and the “one-bad-apple rule.”151 In the recent 
past, this model has had wide bipartisan support, with President 
Obama including an open MEP proposal in his budget for fiscal year 
2017.152 Hatch’s Open MEP law passed the Senate Finance Committee 
on a 26-0 vote in the fall of 2016 with the following language: “two or 
more unrelated private employers [would be allowed] to adopt a defined 
contribution pooled employer plan (PEP) as long as the PEP has a 
pooled plan provider (PPP) as the named fiduciary to the plan.”153 
There are a number of advantages for this PEP/PPP model. First, 
it outsources the myriad fiduciary duties to the PPP.154 These onerous 
fiduciary requirements include: qualifying the plan for tax-favored 
status under the Internal Revenue Code’s non-discrimination rules, 
operating and managing the plan on a day-to-day basis, and engaging 
in investment selection (perhaps through retention of a third-party 
investment advisor).155 The only fiduciary duty that members of the 
PEP would retain would be to prudently select, and then monitor, the 
PPP, thus limiting their exposure to potential fiduciary liability.156 
 
Bill Unanimous Backing, TOWERS WATSON (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.towerswatson.com/en-
US/Insights/Newsletters/Americas/insider/2016/10/senate-committee-gives-retirement-savings-bi 
ll-unanimous-backing [https://perma.cc/T5GT-622V] (“The Retirement Enhancement and Savings 
Act would authorize open MEPs beginning in 2020.”). 
 149 See Sean Forbes, Expanding Multiple Employer Plans Seen Boosting Retirement Savings, 
BLOOMBERG BNA PENSION AND BENEFITS DAILY REPORTER (June 22, 2016), http://www.bna.com/ 
expanding-multiple-employer-n57982074525/ [https://perma.cc/QEA3-ZU55] (“Under current law, 
employers must have a common nexus—such as being in the same industry—to be in a MEP.”). 
 150 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.413-2(a)(3)(iv) (as amended in 1979) and 1.416-1, Q&A (G-1) (1984). 
 151 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 147, at 9. 
 152 See Nevin Adams, Obama Administration Wants to Open Door for Open MEPs, ASPPA.NET 
(Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.asppa.org/News/Article/ArticleID/5813 [https://perma.cc/W88K-69 
BN]. 
 153 See Andrew Remo, MEPs Resurface as ‘PEPs’ as Senate Finance Approves New Retirement 
Bill, NAPE.NET (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.napa-net.org/news/technical-competence/legislation/ 
meps-resurface-as-peps-as-senate-finance-approves-new-retirement-bill/ [https://perma.cc/28JM-
HA2M]. 
 154 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 147, at 10. 
 155 See Remo, supra note 153. 
 156 See supra note 73 (discussing fact that residual fiduciary exists for plan sponsor, and not 
possible to engage in “extreme outsourcing” and delegating all ERISA fiduciary duty from the plan 
sponsor); cf. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828–29 (2015) (holding that plan sponsors of 
401(k) plan still have fiduciary duty in selecting and monitoring participant investment options). 
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Additionally, the price tag of permitting the formation of these 
organizations is relatively low: $3.2 billion over ten years from loss of 
tax revenue from the additional tax deduction for employers and tax-
exempt status for employee contributions.157 
Unfortunately, Hatch’s bill was not enacted in 2016,158 yet it is not 
too far-fetched, given current legislative and regulatory developments 
that the Open MEP bill will be reintroduced during the coming Trump 
presidency and will soon be available for multiple employers in the 
private sector without the common interest and one-bad-apple 
requirement.159 There is also a wide-range of interest groups who 
support the idea of Open MEPs.160 As Senator Elizabeth Warren 
perceptively recognized during hearings on Hatch’s bill, this new 
approach is well-suited for gig employees.161 The bill would allow 
various gig companies to pool their contributions to a common 401(k) 
retirement plan, with all the advantages that come with belonging to a 
large fund.162 Most importantly, such funds would have the advantages 
of providing participating employees diversification, low costs, 
reporting and disclosure requirements, and fiduciary protections based 
on the trust-based status of such 401(k) plans.163 
CONCLUSION 
The rise of the gig economy with its part-time, itinerant, 
independent workers, in conjunction with the employee-centric nature 
of occupational retirement benefits under ERISA, has led to gig 
employees largely lacking meaningful retirement benefits. Current 
proposals to provide portable benefits to gig workers as independent 
workers or independent contractors are unacceptable because such 
benefits would not be secured by the fiduciary consumer protections of 
ERISA. 
 
 157 See Remo, supra note 153. 
 158 See John Iekel, 2017: MEPs, State Plans, Education Loom Large. ASPPA.Net (Jan. 4, 2017), 
http://www.asppa-net.org/News/Article/ArticleID/7122 [https://perma.cc/4Z42-S96W]. 
 159 See Rob Massa, Trump’s Pension Policy, CFO.COM (Dec. 9, 2016), http://ww2.cfo.com/re 
tirement-plans/2016/12/trumps-pension-plan [https://perma.cc/3EGN-DMNC]. 
 160 See Sean Forbes, State Open MEPs Ready to Bloom, But with Challenges, BNA BLOOMBERG 
PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.bna.com/state-open-meps-n57982063895/ 
[https://perma.cc/4CCD-A9J9]. 
 161 See id. (“Proposals should address all kinds of workers, including not only full-time 
employees at small businesses, but also part-time workers, individuals in the gig economy and 
independent contractors, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) said at the hearing.”). 
 162 See Massa, supra note 159. 
 163 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 147, at 10. 
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However, two developments with regard to the retirement security 
of the gig workers are promising. First, there are now increasing 
examples of gig workers being found to be common law employees under 
tests like ERISA’s Darden test. As common law employees, gig workers 
are entitled to the reporting and disclosure, vesting, funding, and 
fiduciary protections of ERISA. Second, the use of an Open MEP model, 
in which PEPs have a PPP as the named fiduciary, are gaining bi-
partisan acceptance. This article encourages Congress to promptly 
adopt the open MEP model, free of current regulatory restrictions, so 
that gig employees can enjoy retirement security with the peace of mind 
that ERISA fiduciary protections provide under industry-wide gig 
employee Open MEPs. 
